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Several researchers have analyzed the security characteristics and weaknesses of electronic
passports (machine readable travel documents) introduced by the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) in its Document 9303. However, little, if any, work has focused on the public
key infrastructures necessary to manage the certiﬁcates that underpin the security measures.
This paper discusses the key aspects related to the management of keys and certiﬁcates to
implement security and privacy measures for machine readable travel documents issued by
European Union member states. In particular, the paper concentrates on extended access
control and the associated Single Point of Contact (SPOC) protocol.
& 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-
NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction
Machine readable travel documents (MRTDs) [13], the ofﬁcial
term used by International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
to describe travel documents that can be automatically read
and processed by a computer system, were introduced in the
European Union (EU) in 2004 [12]. Machine readable travel
documents, also referred to as electronic passports, ePass-
ports or biometric passports, introduce two elements to the
traditional paper passport booklets: one or more biometric
traits that identify the document owner and a contactless
chip that stores data about the owner, including biographical
data (e.g., name and date of birth) and biometric data. ICAO
identiﬁes the facial image as the mandatory main biometric
trait and, optionally, ﬁngerprints and iris image. The authen-
ticity of a machine readable travel document is guaranteed by
security measures based on public key cryptography, in
particular, by passive authentication. The digital signature
of the data stored in a travel document chip by the issuing
country is mandatory as is, obviously, its veriﬁcation by the
destination country.Elsevier B.V. This is an o
nd/3.0/).
u (A. Rana).In addition to the authenticity veriﬁcation measure, the EU
has also mandated the use of basic access control (BAC) as
deﬁned in [9] and, subsequently, supplemental access control
(SAC) [11] based on password authenticated connection estab-
lishment (PACE). These two security mechanisms are designed
to ensure that only entities that have obtained explicit consent
from the machine readable travel document owner may read
the biographical data and the primary biometric trait stored in
the travel document chip. Machine readable travel documents
that implement passive authentication and basic access con-
trol are generally referred to as “ﬁrst generation electronic
passports,” although this is not an ofﬁcial term.
The EU has also mandated the use of secondary biometrics,
the technical details of which are deﬁned in the 2009 [10] and
successive amendments [11]. A security mechanism called
extended access control (EAC) has been designed to work on
top of basic access control and supplemental access control to
ensure that only terminals authorized by the passport issuing
country can access the secondary biometrics. Machine readable
travel documents that implement extended access control to
protect access to secondary biometric traits are referred to aspen access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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that replace basic access control with supplemental access
control are often called “third generation electronic passports.”
Security mechanisms implemented in electronic passports
are based on public key cryptography and, therefore, on the
concept of digital certiﬁcates, which are used to manage the
key exchanges required to digitally sign passports at the
issuing end and to check the digital signatures at the verify-
ing end. In fact, implementing all the security measures
discussed above requires multiple public key infrastructures
(PKIs). At the minimum (i.e., if only the ICAO-mandated
passive authentication is implemented), a country must
establish a public key infrastructure to manage the genera-
tion of passive authentication signatures. This three-level
public key infrastructure has the country signing certiﬁcate
authority (CSCA) as the root, one or more document signers
(DSs) as intermediate nodes and the signed passports as the
leaves.
This paper shows that two additional public key infra-
structures are needed to implement extended access control.
One is used to manage the certiﬁcates required to authenti-
cate the terminals that access sensitive biometric informa-
tion (EAC-PKI) and the other is used to manage the Transport
Layer Security (TLS) protocol based secure channel between
two endpoints (called single points of contact (SPOCs)), which
is required to exchange EAC-PKI certiﬁcates between two
countries. While it is often confused with the public key
infrastructure that manages the certiﬁcates used in passive
authentication, the infrastructure necessary to manage certi-
ﬁcates for extended access control is quite different, and has
speciﬁc characteristics and requirements.
Although many studies have been published on various
aspects of machine readable travel document security (see, e.g.,
[1,17,18]), to the best of our knowledge, no study or review has
dealt with issues related to public key infrastructures and
certiﬁcate management in the context of the extended access
control implementation, including SPOC-to-SPOC communica-
tions. This paper focuses on the key management and certiﬁ-
cation required to implement the infrastructure that supports
machine readable travel documents with extended access
control (EAC-MRTDs). Additionally, it discusses the challenges
involved in managing the certiﬁcation exchanges required to
verify electronic passports.2. Machine readable travel documents
The structure and content of the machine readable travel
document chip, along with the mandatory and optional
security measures, are deﬁned in [14]. Basically, the machine
readable travel document structure consists of a simple ﬁle
system with directories called “dedicated ﬁles” and ﬁles
called “data groups” (DGs). Mandatory data groups are DG1
and DG2. DG1 contains biographic data, which are also
printed in the data page and the machine readable zone
(MRZ), i.e., the set of characters at the bottom of the data
page, which contains data about the owner and the docu-
ment, and can be read automatically through optical means.
In the personalization process, the owner's biographic
data and machine readable zone are printed on the datapage, while the same data along with the biometric traits are
stored in the corresponding data group in the chip protec-
ted by passive authentication and the access control mechan-
isms described below. The process of reading and verifying
that a machine readable travel document issued by an EU
member state is genuine starts by optically reading the data
page and the machine readable zone data, which activates
the access control protocol that, if successful, exposes the
chip contents. If the machine readable travel document is a
second generation passport (i.e., it also contains ﬁngerprints),
the associated more restrictive access control mechanism is
also executed. Fig. 1 shows that, when checking the identity
of a foreign citizen, the visited country can use the biometric
data stored in the chip only if authorized to so by the country
that issued the ePassport.
As mentioned above, a set of security mechanisms are
implemented to guarantee that a machine readable travel
document chip is genuine and also to regulate the reading of
the chip contents. Inspection systems (ISs) are used to interact
with machine readable travel document chips; these systems
are ofﬁcial terminals that are entitled to read the chips. At the
beginning of an interaction between an inspection system and
a travel document, an access control mechanism is executed
to verify that the inspection system is authorized to access the
chip contents.
Two access control mechanisms exist for machine read-
able travel documents: basic access control (BAC) and pass-
word authenticated connection establishment (PACE) [14,16].
Both mechanisms rely on the same principle, even if they
offer different security properties – the machine readable
zone of the document has to be known by the inspection
system that is attempting access and a string in the zone is
used by the two parties as a shared secret to run a mutual
authentication protocol. This mutual authentication protocol
is also used to set a common secret key that is used to
encrypt and authenticate subsequent communications. To
make the inspection system aware of the machine readable
zone, the relative string can be typed by an ofﬁcial or it could
be optically acquired from the document data page; on the
other hand, the machine readable zone information is
already known to the chip because it is stored in the chip
memory. If the access granted, the inspection system can
read the machine readable zone information and the docu-
ment holder's facial image that is stored in the chip. This
mechanism is incorporated to prevent unauthorized reading
of the chip (note that the document holder has to grant
physical access to the document data page to allow the
operation).
Table 1 shows the access control mechanisms used for
data groups that contain document holder data. Note that, if
the inspection system intends to access biometric data stored
in a chip, it is necessary to execute the extended access
control (EAC) mechanism after the initial BAC/PACE. The
access control mechanism enables the inspection system to
prove that it has been entitled by the issuing country of the
travel document to read the stored biometric data. It also
enables the inspection system to verify that the chip has not
been cloned. The extended access control mechanism, which
has been adopted for European ePassports [10], is described in
detail in the next section.
Table 1 – Access control of ePassport data groups con-
taining document holder data.
DG Data Access control
DG1 Machine readable zone BAC/PACE
DG2 Facial image BAC/PACE
DG3 Fingerprints BAC/PACEþEAC
DG4 Iris image BAC/PACEþEAC
Fig. 1 – Identity and citizenship checking in a foreign country using an ePassport.
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chip contents have not been modiﬁed [14]. Essentially, each
country owns a public-private key pair and uses the private
key to sign the chip contents of all the machine readable
travel documents that it issues. The associated public key
is enclosed in a digital certiﬁcate made available to other
countries, which is installed in their inspection systems. Each
inspection system can verify that the chip data is genuine by
checking the country signature on the certiﬁcate.
Veriﬁcation of the authenticity of a travel document via
passive authentication requires a directory system, or a
repository, in which the root certiﬁcates (CSCA) and the
document signing certiﬁcates (DS) of all the countries that
issue travel documents can be stored and accessed when
passive authentication based veriﬁcation has to be executed.
The repository must also contain certiﬁcate revocation lists
that identify all the certiﬁcates that have been revoked. ICAO
uses its public key directory (PKD) to provide an automated
system for subscribers to download document signing certi-
ﬁcates and certiﬁcate revocation lists. This simpliﬁes themanagement of a local directory system because, in order
to obtain the document signing certiﬁcates, subscribing
countries only have to synchronize their local directories
with the ICAO public key directory using the Lightweight
Directory Access Protocol (LDAP).
wHowever, things are a bit different for CSCA certiﬁcates.
ICAO does not provide the ability to download CSCA certiﬁ-
cates directly. This is because exchanging, verifying the
origin and trust of the root certiﬁcate for a country is not
the responsibility of ICAO. Rather, it is recommended that
this be done bilaterally via diplomatic means.
The ICAO public key directory does, however, offer the
possibility to acquire CSCA certiﬁcates through master lists
(MLs). The concept and the principle of use of a master list are
described in [15]. A master list is essentially a list of CSCA
certiﬁcates signed by a country that has obtained them in
a trusted manner and guarantees their authenticity. The
guarantee is based on a digital signature by the country that
issues the master list. Master lists, currently produced by
Germany, Switzerland and Australia, may be downloaded
from the ICAO public key directory. Document signing certi-
ﬁcates, certiﬁcate revocation lists and master lists are avail-
able from the ICAO public key directory to entities that do not
subscribe to the service in the form of LDIF (Lightweight
Directory Interchange Format) ﬁles. Of course, subscribing to
the public key directory service and connecting to it via LDAP
facilitate timely and reliable access to document signing
certiﬁcates and certiﬁcate revocation lists, although there is
a cost associated with this service.
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This section describes the extended access control (EAC)
mechanism used by an inspection system and machine read-
able travel document chip to authenticate each other and to
manage inspection system rights. The public key infrastructure
is presented, followed by the protocol that is executed by the
inspection system and the machine readable travel document.
3.1. Public key infrastructure
The extended access control system is based on public key
cryptography and digital certiﬁcates [4]. It is primarily intended
to assign a certiﬁcate to each inspection system that speciﬁes
the access rights of the inspection system to biometric data
stored in travel document chips with which it interacts (i.e.,
if the data can be read or not).
Each country that adheres to the extended access control
scheme is required to set up the public key infrastructure shown
in Fig. 2. The entities constituting the public key infrastructure
are country verifying certiﬁcation authorities (CVCAs), document
veriﬁers (DVs) and inspection systems (ISs). Each entity has a
public–private key pair along with a certiﬁcate that encloses the
public key. Certiﬁcates have validity periods; certiﬁcates asso-
ciated with document veriﬁers and inspection systems also
specify their rights to biometric data.
The CVCA represents the trust point for each participating
country. It is typically managed by a government entity, with
the CVCA's certiﬁcate self-signed with the CVCA's private key.
The CVCA signs and issues certiﬁcates for document veriﬁers,
which specify the rights of each document veriﬁer to the
biometric data stored in travel documents issued by the
corresponding country. A document veriﬁer is an intermediateFig. 2 – Public key infrastructure forentity, introduced for organizational reasons, that manages a
group of inspection systems. Each document veriﬁer acts as
a certiﬁcation authority, signing and issuing a certiﬁcate for
each inspection system in its jurisdiction and specifying its
access rights.
As shown in Fig. 2, the CVCA can issue certiﬁcates to
domestic document veriﬁers (located within the country)
as well as to foreign document veriﬁers (located in other
countries). This is a key aspect for authorizing the use of
biometric data in travel document chips outside the issuing
country. Speciﬁcally, if a document veriﬁer intends to author-
ize its inspection systems to read biometric data stored in
travel documents issued by another country, it has to apply
for a document veriﬁer certiﬁcate from the CVCA of that
country. Thus, each document veriﬁer would have certiﬁcates
from a number of CVCAs.
A CVCA determines the rights of various domestic and
foreign document veriﬁers according to internal policies. The
document veriﬁers, in turn, assign their rights or a restricted
set of rights (e.g., granting access to only a portion of the
biometric data) to their inspection systems according to
internal rules. The CVCA also determines the document
veriﬁer certiﬁcate validity, which is typically kept short to
mitigate issues related to the loss or theft of inspection
systems, which could be exploited by unauthorized entities
to access sensitive data. The inspection system certiﬁcate
validity is assigned by the issuing document veriﬁer; it may
reﬂect the validity period of the document veriﬁer certiﬁcate
or be a sub-interval of the validity period. Table 2 shows the
certiﬁcate validity periods for various entities according to
the Common Certiﬁcate Policy for EU member states [5].
Fig. 3 shows a certiﬁcate scheduling scheme for CVCAs,
document veriﬁers and inspection systems. When a CVCA
certiﬁcate is about to expire, the issuing country generates aextended access control (EAC).
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certiﬁcate, a link certiﬁcate is produced as well, which estab-
lishes a connection between the new and old CVCA certiﬁ-
cates. The link certiﬁcate contains the public key of the new
CVCA certiﬁcate. It has the same validity period as the new
certiﬁcate and is signed with the private key of the old CVCA
certiﬁcate [5]. Note that at most two valid CVCA certiﬁcates
can coexist at the same time. After the new CVCA certiﬁcate
and key pair are generated, they are used to issue new
document veriﬁer certiﬁcates that are, in turn, used to issue
new inspection system certiﬁcates.
The card veriﬁable certiﬁcate (CVC) format is used for the
certiﬁcates in the extended access control public key infra-
structure. This format is particularly suitable when certiﬁcates
have to be interpreted and used by resource-constrained
devices such as machine readable travel document chips,
which are basically contactless smartcards and have to per-
form computations on the certiﬁcates. In particular, during the
extended access control (EAC) protocol, the chip has to validate
the certiﬁcate received by the inspection system in order to
authenticate it and check its rights.
A machine readable travel document chip stores the
current valid CVCA certiﬁcate of its country (Fig. 2), which
is used as the trust point by the chip. Indeed, when theTable 2 – Certiﬁcate validity periods for EU member
states.
Entity Minimum period Maximum period
CVCA 6 months 3 years
Document veriﬁer 2 weeks 3 months
Inspection system 1 day 1 month
Fig. 3 – Scheduling of certiﬁcates in extended adocument interacts with an inspection system, a certiﬁcate
chain is established starting from the inspection system
certiﬁcate up to the trust point of the chip – this is the
concatenation of the inspection system certiﬁcate, document
veriﬁer certiﬁcate, CVCA certiﬁcate and, if appropriate, the
link and other CVCA certiﬁcates up to the CVCA certiﬁcate
that resides in chip memory. The trust point enables the chip
to check the validity of the signatures along the entire length
of the certiﬁcate chain. Note that the ﬁrst inspection system,
document veriﬁer and CVCA certiﬁcates in the chain are the
current valid certiﬁcates, while the remaining link and CVCA
certiﬁcates, if present, are accepted by the chip even if they
have expired. This mechanism guarantees that travel docu-
ments issued in the past can interact with inspection systems
that have recent certiﬁcates.
At this time, a mechanism to update the trust point of
a chip is foreseen, along with a solution to maintain an
approximation of the current date on the chip, which would
be used to check the validity period of certiﬁcates in the
chain. In particular, since the initial current date reﬂects the
date that the travel document was created, the chip would
have to update it with the most recent date of the start of the
validity period of a valid certiﬁcate received from a CVCA,
document veriﬁer or domestic inspection system located in
the same country that issued the travel document. At the
same time, when CVCA certiﬁcates still in their validity
period and guaranteed by link certiﬁcates are received by a
travel document, they are stored as new trust points in the
chip; previous CVCA certiﬁcates that have expired are
removed from the chip. Note that, at most two trust points
would be stored in chip memory because no more than two
CVCA certiﬁcates can be valid at the same time (see Fig. 3).ccess control with relative chains of trust.
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extended access control public key infrastructure because
travel document chips could not access or download these
lists in a simple manner. This provides additional motivation
to keep the certiﬁcate validity period short as shown in
Table 2 in order to mitigate the risk associated with compro-
mised document veriﬁers and lost or stolen terminals.
3.2. Authentication protocols
The extended access control protocol is executed by an
inspection system and a machine readable travel document
in order for the inspection system to access the biometric data
stored in the travel document chip. The protocol, presented in
Fig. 4, is divided into two parts that are performed in succes-
sion. The ﬁrst part involves chip authentication and the
second involves terminal authentication [2].
Chip authentication involves the execution of the Difﬁe–
Hellman key agreement protocol between the inspection
system and the travel document; this enables the two parties
to have a shared secret and for the inspection system to
implicitly authenticate the travel document chip. The chip
stores a static public–private key pair PuKPassport, PrKPassport.
PrKPassport is inaccessible and used only internally by the chip,
whereas PuKPassport is read by the inspection system. The





IS and returns the relative public key PuK
0
IS to the chip. This
key exchange enables the inspection system and the travel
document to execute the Difﬁe–Hellman protocol and to
agree on a common secret used for encrypting and authenti-
cating subsequent communications.
This mechanism also enables the travel document chip to be
implicitly authenticated. The key PuKPassport is digitally signed by
the country that issued the travel document; it is a part of the
data involved in the passive authenticationmechanism and theFig. 4 – Extended access csignature is checked by the inspection system immediately
after chip authentication, thereby verifying that it is genuine.
Thus, only a chip that knows the relative PrKPassport can run the
correct Difﬁe–Hellman protocol and then successfully engage in
encrypted communications with the inspection system. This
prevents the chip cloning because, even if PuKPassport and the
country signature are copied to another chip, the relative
private key is not known.
Terminal authentication involves the execution of a
challenge-response protocol that enables the chip to verify
that the inspection system is authentic. As mentioned above,
the inspection system is equipped with a key pair PuKIS, PrKIS
and an inspection system certiﬁcate that encloses the relative
public key, while the travel document chip has the CVCA
certiﬁcate from its issuing country. The protocol begins by the
inspection system sending the certiﬁcate chain starting from
its inspection system certiﬁcate up to the CVCA certiﬁcate
stored in the travel document chip. The travel document chip
checks the validity periods of the certiﬁcates using its inter-
nal notion of current date and veriﬁes their signatures relying
on its trust point, eventually extracting PuKIS from the
inspection system certiﬁcate. Note that the internal current
date and trust points could be updated on the basis of the
received certiﬁcates. Next, a random challenge is generated
and sent to the inspection system, which, in turn, returns the
challenge signed with its private key PrKIS. The travel docu-
ment veriﬁes the signature and, if the check is successful,
grants access to the biometric data according to the rights
speciﬁed in the inspection system certiﬁcate.
The protocol described above is called Chip and Terminal
Authentication Version 1 and is required by EU ePassports
[11]. Another version, Chip and Terminal Authentication
Version 2, has been deﬁned [3]. This version performs
the chip and terminal authentications in reverse order (i.e.,
the inspection system is authenticated before the travelontrol (EAC) protocol.
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that the version may be adopted by inspection systems and
machine readable travel document chips.
Note that the extended access control protocol is by no
means a single cryptographic solution. Indeed, a suite of
algorithms and protocols is speciﬁed (e.g., DH and ECDH for
key agreement, and RSA and ECDSA for digital signatures).
Interested readers are referred to [4] for more details.4. Single point of contact
The various entities in the extended access control public key
infrastructure have to communicate in order to renew their
digital certiﬁcates over time (e.g., document veriﬁers have to
periodically request new certiﬁcates from CVCAs). As discussed
in the previous section, certiﬁcate validity tends to be short, so
an automatic system for certiﬁcate renewal is needed. Internal
communications for certiﬁcate distribution within each EU
member state are left to the relevant member state authority,
and no speciﬁcations are provided regarding the issuance of
certiﬁcates from a CVCA to its domestic document veriﬁers.
However, a system for certiﬁcate exchange between countries
has been formally deﬁned [7]. Its main purpose is to support
periodic document veriﬁer certiﬁcate requests directed at
foreign CVCAs.
Fig. 5 presents the architecture for inter-country commu-
nications. Each country sets up a single point of contact
(SPOC) system, essentially an interface between the country
and other countries. All inter-country communications are
conducted through their SPOCs, which are connected to the
Internet. A SPOC collects certiﬁcate requests from each
domestic document veriﬁer, sends them to the SPOCs of the
destination countries, which, in turn, forward the requests to
their CVCAs. A certiﬁcate generated by a CVCA (or a failure
notiﬁcation) is returned along the same path, in reverseFig. 5 – SPOC architecture for extendedorder, up to the document veriﬁer that originated the request.
Thus, a SPOC, on one hand, collects and forwards internal
document veriﬁer requests directed at foreign CVCAs and, on
the other, collects and forwards foreign requests addressed to
its domestic CVCA.
4.1. Public key infrastructure
Inter-country SPOC communications are offered as web
services. The URL of each SPOC, and its system description
and functionality are published. Communications between
SPOCs are secured using the public key infrastructure shown
in Fig. 6. Each SPOC has a root certiﬁcate authority that signs
two SPOC certiﬁcates, a client certiﬁcate used by the SPOC to
authenticate itself to foreign SPOCs and a server certiﬁcate
used to authenticate the SPOC as a web service provider to
other countries. Note that an intermediate certiﬁcate author-
ity may be positioned between the root certiﬁcate authority
and the SPOC client/server certiﬁcates. SPOCs rely on these
certiﬁcates to establish TLS connections with other SPOCs
after mutual authentication.
Table 3 presents the validity periods for SPOC public key
infrastructure elements. As in the case of CVCA certiﬁcates,
SPOC root certiﬁcate authority certiﬁcates are renewed and
link certiﬁcates are generated as needed.
Note that a suite of algorithms and protocols is speciﬁed
for SPOC communications (RSA or ECDSA may be used for
authentication). Certiﬁcates are based on the X.509 format [7].
4.2. Operational aspects
To support activities in the architecture described above,
countries must initially register using an out-of-band commu-
nications channel [5]. In particular, each country must provide
registration data to the European Commission through
secure diplomatic means. This includes the country SPOC rootaccess control key management.
i n t e r n a t i o n a l j o u r n a l o f c r i t i c a l i n f r a s t r u c t u r e p r o t e c t i o n 7 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 2 3 3 – 2 4 3240certiﬁcate authority, SPOC URL and CVCA certiﬁcate, along
with other data. The European Commission makes this data
available to other countries, which have to insert the registra-
tion information in their systems. The registration information
may be exchanged bilaterally between countries, but the
European Commission must also receive the registration
information. After the initial registration has taken place,
subsequent CVCA and SPOC root certiﬁcate authority certiﬁ-
cate updates of a country, along with the associated link
certiﬁcates, are distributed using the SPOC architecture; all
that the recipients have to do is to check the validity of the
certiﬁcates.
In the certiﬁcate request process (for inspection system
requests directed at a document veriﬁer and for document
veriﬁer requests directed at a CVCA), the applicant generates
a new key pair and signs the request (which encloses the new
public key) with the private key corresponding to the valid
certiﬁcate. The entity receiving the request checks its validity
and issues a new certiﬁcate, if appropriate. In the case of a
document veriﬁer request to a foreign CVCA, the initial
certiﬁcate request of the document veriﬁer is signed by the
CVCA private key of its country, and subsequent requests
directed at the same foreign CVCA are signed using the
document veriﬁer private key corresponding to the last
certiﬁcate issued by the foreign entity.
The SPOC system implements four messages: Request Certiﬁcate: This message is used by a SPOC to
forward a certiﬁcate request from one of its document
veriﬁers to a foreign CVCA. Send Certiﬁcate: This message is used by a SPOC to send a
certiﬁcate to a requesting SPOC.Table 3 – Validity periods for SPOC public key
infrastructure elements.Get CA Certiﬁcate: This message is sent by a SPOC to a
foreign SPOC to receive valid CVCA certiﬁcates (link and
self-signed certiﬁcates) from the foreign country.PKI element Validity period
SPOC root CA certiﬁcate Maximum 13 yearsGeneral Message: This message is used to transmit SPOC–
SPOC generic messages in a human-readable format.SPOC root CA private key usage Maximum 3.5 years
SPOC client/server certiﬁcate 6–18 monthsThe messages may be synchronous or asynchronous. In
particular, when a RequestCertiﬁcate message is sent, theFig. 6 – Public key infrastructure foresponse may or may not contain the requested certiﬁcate.
In the ﬁrst case, the certiﬁcate is simply attached to the
message response. Otherwise, the response is simply used to
acknowledge message receipt, with the certiﬁcate sent later
via a SendCertiﬁcate message.5. Discussion
Implementing the infrastructure required to read the second-
ary biometric traits in machine readable travel documents
can be a complex task. In conferences and technical meet-
ings, some developers have expressed a general feeling that
the SPOC speciﬁcations are too complex and should be
improved, for instance with regard to the deﬁnition of the
initial pairing between two SPOCs and in relation to error
handling. Other suggestions for improvement include deﬁn-
ing a semantics for the free-text content of general messages
in order to use the SPOC protocol to securely exchange CSCA/
document veriﬁer certiﬁcates.
Some confusion about the concept, role, scope and function-
ing of SPOCs exists. One example is the concern that a SPOC
would somehow be associated with or facilitate ﬁngerprint
exchange. This is far from the truth, as has been explained in
Section 4: the SPOC protocol only provides a mechanism to
securely exchange extended access control related certiﬁcation
requests between two countries that are mutually authorized to
access the secure areas of each other's travel document chips.
It is true, however, that bilateral set-ups would complicate
the process as the number of participating countries increasesr secure SPOC communications.
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Special attention needs to focus on setting-up automated
border crossing systems, where travelers could position their
passports near optical contactless readers, face the camera to
have their pictures taken to be matched with facial images
stored in their passport chips, and place their ﬁngers on
ﬁngerprint readers for ﬁngerprint veriﬁcation. These auto-
mated systems, often called “e-gates,” may require online
connections for the extended access control, whereas the
passive authentication component (i.e., CSCA and document
signature checks) could also work efﬁciently with ofﬂine daily
updates of the databases. Similar considerations would apply
to mobile devices that could be used to read travel documents;
these devices would have to execute passive authentication as
well as extended access control.
The challenge posed by the SPOC concept is not merely to
specify a few issues in detail or to publish a technical note or
guideline describing the implementation requirements or
cipher parameter set-ups. Rather, as in the case of all large
infrastructure projects that are of an organizational and
process nature, SPOC is also affected by the organizational
set-up of the implementing country. Viewed in this light, the
Common Certiﬁcate Policy [5], which is mandatory for all EU
member states, provides useful and important indications in
addition to the mandatory requirements.
5.1. Operational aspects
As discussed in the earlier sections of this paper, implementing
extended access control and the associated SPOCs requires
setting-up a complex infrastructure, which has technical, orga-
nizational and process implications. Difﬁculties also arise as a
result of different organizations or authorities being responsible
for the infrastructure and its operation, and for the veriﬁcation of
travel documents. However, these aspects are obviously outside
the scope of any international standard because they deal with
the implementation within a country rather than the commu-
nications and exchange of information between countries. For
this reason, only guidelines or technical reports could be provided
about implementing the internal infrastructure necessary for
extended access control and SPOC. Substantial assistance regard-
ing the harmonization of measures – other than technical and
extended access control/SPOC oriented issues – comes from the
Common Certiﬁcate Policy [5], which mandates the minimum
measures that must be taken at the national level to guarantee
adequate, common and minimum levels of security.
In addition to drawing attention to [5], it is worth mentioning
that guidelines for the local implementation of an extended
access control public key infrastructure is provided by a BSI
technical report [6], which speciﬁes a SOAP-based protocol for
national certiﬁcate management and a public key infrastructure.
This technical report also provides guidelines on public key
infrastructure related communications between terminals, tra-
vel documents and the portion of the internal infrastructure
that handles certiﬁcates. These guidelines are directed at
entities who wish to build inspection systems that support
extended access control.
In [6], an inspection system (also called a terminal in [6])
comprises a reader (i.e., a contactless reading device that estab-
lishes a radio communications channel with the machinereadable travel document chip) and software that manages the
information exchange and security protocols. Several readers
can be associated with a single inspection system, facilitating the
management of the private keys used for extended access
control at the terminal level and not at the single reader level,
as well as the efﬁcient storage of the keys in a hardware security
module. This also means that the terminal, even if associated
with more than one reader, has a unique identity for the
responsible document veriﬁer.
The BSI report [6] also proposes that distributed terminals be
coordinated by a terminal control center (TCC) and that all
readers in a terminal should have a permanent secured online
connection with the terminal control center; the actual security
measures in place for securing such a connection would, of
course, depend on the local environment. The protocol covers
themanagement of CSCA certiﬁcates andmaster lists as well as
extended access control certiﬁcate management. This technical
guideline, although not part of the required standards, could
provide useful guidance for implementing the internal portion
of the extended access control public key infrastructure.
Other considerations related to operational aspects include
the need to secure Internet access to SPOCs and, in particular,
protect the links between SPOCs and the CVCA. In fact, it is
advisable that the SPOC–CVCA link not be automated, but
instead involve by manual intervention in a highly-secure
environment. Finally, other obvious measures such as high
availability, regular security audits, separation of trusted roles,
two-person principles, which are also required by the certiﬁ-
cate policy, should be implemented.5.2. Testing and interoperability
Interoperability, the ability of two systems to exchange
information and to interpret and use the exchanged informa-
tion, is a central concept in order to use machine readable
travel documents efﬁciently. Interoperability has a variety of
aspects ranging from protocols to cryptosystems. Testing
interoperability is not a straightforward process. In fact, it is
common to test devices and software implementations for
conformity to standards and then organize test interoper-
ability events in which different inspection systems and
machine readable travel document implementations from
different vendors are tested against each other.
Interoperability testing is necessary because it may happen
that two implementations, while conforming to the standards
and passing conformity tests, are still unable to interoperate.
Issues that could affect system interoperability include ambig-
uous deﬁnitions of options in the standards, different inter-
pretations of options as well as implementation ﬂaws. Different
vendors and different organizational structures with different
operational processes also play a role.
ICAO has organized a series of interoperability test events
for machine readable travel documents (e.g., Canberra in 2004
and Berlin in 2006); the European Union has also organized an
event in Prague in 2008. These events helped identify pro-
blems, which were subsequently corrected by vendors. In
particular, extended access control testing was performed at
the last major interoperability event held in Prague in 2008
[8]; however, SPOC operations were not tested. Document
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loaded manually into the software that executes chip authen-
tication and terminal authentication between machine read-
able travel documents and inspection systems.
In addition, although test suites for machine readable travel
document conformity tests are deﬁned at the ICAO and EU
levels (for ﬁrst and second generation passports, respectively),
no formal test suite exists for the SPOC protocol. However, as
said before, conformity does not guarantee interoperability
and, indeed, interoperability can be tested independently of
conformity tests. Because SPOC-to-SPOC communications are
managed at the bilateral level, the same can be done for
interoperability testing. Testing against a reference implemen-
tation, similar to the reference inspection system implementa-
tion used in the interoperability test events, would be very
useful in the context of interoperability.
wIn the absence of a test speciﬁcation, an interoperability
testing plan for SPOCs could be devised. Such a plan could
include Successful registration of a foreign SPOC at both ends.
 Successful establishment of a TLS secure channel between
two SPOCs using the full range of supported cryptographic
algorithms and protocols. Successful exchange of SPOC message handling (synchro-
nous and asynchronous request-response) for all SPOC
messages (i.e., RequestCertiﬁcate, SendCertiﬁcate, GetCA-
Certiﬁcate and GeneralMessage). Proper handling of error messages and error situations (e.g.,
response not received, unsuccessful decoding of the mes-
sage content, unsupported features or algorithms, incorrect
use of parameters, etc.). Successful execution of extended access control and the
reading of secondary biometrics in DG3.
Such a test plan should cover the exchange of all the SPOC
protocol messages and verify that the receiving end successfully
processes correctly-formatted as well as incorrectly-formatted
messages. The test results should document unexpected beha-
vior and error handling in situations that are not explicitly
deﬁned in the SPOC standard.6. Conclusions
Machine readable travel documents or ePassports were intro-
duced in the European Union in 2004, and are rapidly being
rolled out in countries around the world. Obviously, the security
of ePassports and the ePassport processing infrastructure are
vital issues. The ePassport processing infrastructure relies on
certiﬁcate management to guarantee the authenticity, access
control and privacy of machine readable travel documents
issued by European Union member states. This paper is the
ﬁrst to provide insights into the extended access control public
key infrastructure and the SPOC protocol that provide the
foundation for ePassport processing in the European Union. It
is hoped that the discussion of the major issues associated with
the interoperability and the operational aspects of the asso-
ciated infrastructure will stimulate renewed research in the
area and contribute to the development of secure, reliable and
efﬁcient implementations.r e f e r e n c e s
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